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ABSTRACT
Reliable functioning of infrastructure networks is essential for our modern society. Cascading
failures are the cause of most large-scale network outages. Although cascading failures often exhibit
dynamical transients, the modeling of cascades has so far mainly focused on the analysis of sequences
of steady states. In this article, we focus on electrical transmission networks and introduce a
framework that takes into account both the event-based nature of cascades and the essentials of the
network dynamics. We nd that transients of the order of seconds in the ows of a power grid play
a crucial role in the emergence of collective behaviors. We nally propose a forecasting method to
identify critical lines and components in advance or during operation. Overall, our work highlights
the relevance of dynamically induced failures on the synchronization dynamics of national power
grids of dierent European countries and provides methods to predict and model cascading failures.
INTRODUCTION
Our daily lives heavily depend on the functioning of
many natural and man-made networks, ranging from
neuronal and gene regulatory networks to communication
systems, transportation networks and electrical power
grids [1, 2]. Understanding the robustness of these net-
works with respect to random failures and to targeted
attacks is of outmost importance for preventing system
outages with severe implications [3]. Recent examples,
as the 2003 blackout in the Northeastern United States
[4], the major European blackout in 2006 [5] or the In-
dian blackout in 2012 [6], have shown that initially local
and small events can trigger large area outages of elec-
tric supply networks aecting millions of people, with
severe economic and political consequences [7]. Cascad-
ing events will become more likely in the future due to
increasing load [8] and additional uctuations in the grid
[9]. For this reason cascading failures have been stud-
ied intensively in statistical physics, and dierent net-
work topologies and non-local eects have been consid-
ered and analyzed [1018]. Complementary studies have
employed simplied topologies that admit analytical in-
sights, for instance in terms of percolation theory [19]
or minimum coupling [20]. Results have shown, for in-
stance, the robustness of scale-free networks [3, 21, 22],
or the vulnerability of multiplex networks [2326].
Although real-world cascades often include dynamical




ned spatio-temporal structures, so far models of cas-
cading failures have mainly focused on event-triggered
sequences of steady states [1316, 2730] or on purely dy-
namical descriptions of desynchronization without con-
sidering secondary failure of lines [3135]. In particular,
in supply networks such as electric power grids, which are
considered as uniquely critical among all infrastructures
[36], the failure of transmission lines during a blackout
is determined not only by the network topology and by
the static distribution of the electricity ow, but also by
the collective transient dynamics of the entire system.
Indeed, during the severe outages mentioned above, cas-
cading failures in electric power grids happened on time
scales of dozens of minutes overall, but often started due
to the failure of a single element [37]. Conversely, se-
quences of individual line overloads took place on a much
shorter time scale of seconds [4, 5], the time scale of sys-
temic instabilities, emphasizing the role of transient dy-
namics in the emergence of collective behaviors. For ex-
ample, during the European blackout in 2006, a total of
33 high voltage transmission lines tripped within a time
period of 1 minute and 20 seconds, with 30 of those lines
failing within the rst 19 seconds [5]. Notwithstanding
the importance of these fast transients, the causes, trig-
gers and propagation of cascades induced by transient dy-
namics have been considered only in a few works [10, 38],
and still need to be systematically studied [39]. Hence,
we here focus on characterizing the dynamics of events
that take place at the short time scale of seconds, which
substantially contribute to the overall outages occurring
in real grids.
This work complements the existing studies on cascad-
ing failures in power grids by linking nonlinear transient
dynamics on short time scales to cascade events and si-
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multaneously capturing line failures due to static over-
load. It is yet unrealistic to capture all aspects and time
scales within a single model that is analytically tractable
and provides mechanistic insights. Most of the previous
studies [1316, 2730, 41], based on the analysis of se-
quences of steady states, consider the eects of power
plant shutdown or line outages and did not take into ac-
count any transient dynamical eects at all. In contrast,
a dynamical model might provide insights into cascading
failures potentially induced on short time scales, thereby
characterizing the time scales relevant to the majority of
line failures.
In this article, we propose a general framework to
analyze the impact of transient dynamics (of the order
of seconds) on the outcome of cascading failures taking
place over a complex network. Specically, we go be-
yond purely topological or event-based investigations and
present a dynamical model for electrical transmission net-
works that incorporates both the event-based nature of
cascades and the properties of network dynamics, includ-
ing transients, which, as we will show, can signicantly
increase the vulnerability of a network [10]. These tran-
sients describe the dynamical response of system vari-
ables, such as grid frequency and power ow, when one
steady state is lost and the grid changes to a new steady
state. Combining microscopic nonlinear dynamics tech-
niques with a macroscopic statistical analysis of the sys-
tem, we will rst show that, even when a network seems
to be robust because in the large majority of the cases the
initial failure of its lines does only have local eects, there
exist a few specic lines which can trigger large-scale cas-
cades. We will then analyze the vulnerability of a net-
work by looking at the dynamical properties of cascading
failures. To identify the critical lines of the network we
introduce and analytically derive a ow-based classier
that is shown to outperform measures solely relying on
the network topology, local loads or network susceptibil-
ities (line outage distribution factors). Finally, we nd
that the distance of a line failure from the initial trigger
and the time of the line failure are highly correlated, es-
pecially when a measure of eective distance is adopted
[40].
RESULTS
The dynamics of cascading failures
Failures are common in many interconnected systems,
such as communication, transport and supply networks,
which are fundamental ingredients of our modern soci-
eties. Usually, the failure of a single unit, or of a part
of a network, is modeled by removing or deactivating a
set of nodes or lines (or links) in the corresponding graph
[42]. The most elementary damage to a network consists
in the removal of a single line, since removing a node is
equivalent to deactivate more than one line, namely all
those lines incident in the node. For this reason, in the
following of this work, we concentrate on line failures.
In practice, the malfunctioning of a line in a transporta-
tion/communication network can either be due to an ex-
ogenous or to an endogenous event [43, 44]. In the rst
case, the line breakdown is caused by something external
to the network. Examples are the lightning strike of a
transmission line of the electric power grid, or the sag-
ging of a line in the heat of the summer. In the case of
endogenous events, instead, a line can fail because of an
overload due to an anomalous distributions of the ows
over the network. Hence, the failure is an eect of the
entire network.
Complex networks are also prone to cascading failures.
In these events, the failure of a component triggers the
successive failures of other parts of the network. In this
way, an initial local shock produces a sequence of mul-
tiple failures in a domino mechanism which may nally
aect a substantial part of the network. Cascading fail-
ures occur in transportation systems [45, 46], in computer
networks [47], in nancial systems [48], but also in sup-
ply networks [23]. When, for some either exogenous or
endogenous reason, a line of a supply network fails, its
load has to be somehow redistributed to the neighboring
lines. Although these lines are in general capable of han-
dling their extra trac, in a few unfortunate cases they
will also go overload and will need to redistribute their in-
creased load to their neighbors. This mechanism can lead
to a cascade of failures, with a large number of transmis-
sion lines aected and malfunctioning at the same time.
One particular critical supply network is the electrical
power grid displaying for example large-scale cascading
failures during the blackout on 14 August 2003, aecting
millions of people in North America, and the European
blackout that occurred on 4 November 2006. In order
to model cascading failures in power transmission net-
works, we propose to use the framework of the swing
equation, see Eq. (14) in Methods, to evaluate, at each
time, the actual power ow along the transmission lines
of the network and compare it to the actual available
capacity of the lines, see Methods. Typical studies of
network robustness and cascading failures in power grids
adopted quasi-static perspectives [1316, 2730] based on
xed-point estimates of the variables describing the node
states. Such approach, in the context of the swing equa-
tion, is equivalent to the evaluation of the angles {θi} as
the xed point solution of Eq. (14) or power ow analy-
sis [36]. In contrast, we use here the swing equation to
dynamically update the angles θi (t) as functions of time,
and to compute real-time estimates of the ow on each
line. The ow on the line (i, j) at time t is obtained as:
Fij (t) = Kij sin (θj (t)− θi (t)) . (1)
Having the time evolution of the ow along the line (i, j),
we compare it to the capacity Cij of the line, i.e., to
the maximum ow that the line can tolerate. There are
multiple options how we can dene the capacity of a line
in the framework of the swing equation. One possibility














































































Figure 1. Dynamical overload reveals additional line failures compared to static ow analysis. (a) A ve node power
network with two generators P+ = 1.5/s2 (green squares), three consumers P− = −1/s2 (red circles), homogeneous coupling
K ≈ 1.63/s2, and tolerance α = 0.6 is analyzed. To trigger a cascade, we remove the line marked with a lightening bolt (2,4) at
time t = 1s. Other lines are color coded as the ows in (c) and (d). (b) We observe a cascading failure with several additional
line failures after the initial trigger due to the propagation of overloads. (c) The common quasi-static approach of analyzing
xed point ows would have predicted no additional line failures, since the new xed point is stable with all ows below the
capacity threshold. (d) Conversely, the transient dynamics from the initial to the new xed point overloads additional lines
which then fail when their ows exceed their capacity (gray area).
would allow a maximum ow equal to Fij = Kij on the
line (i, j) . However, in realistic settings, ohmic losses
would induce overheating of the lines which has to be
avoided. Hence, we assume that the capacity Cij is set
to be a tunable percentage of Kij . In order to prevent
damage and keep ground clearance [49, 50], the line (i, j)
is then shut down if the ow on it exceeds the value αKij ,
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a control parameter of the model. The
overload condition on the line (i, j) at time t nally reads:
overload: |Fij(t)| > Cij = αKij . (2)
Notice that the capacity Cij = αKij is an absolute capac-
ity, i.e., it is independent from the initial state of the sys-
tem. This is dierent from the denition of a relative ca-
pacity, C̃ij := (1 + α)Fij (0), which has been commonly
adopted in the literature [10, 27, 51].
Having dened the xed point of the grid, given by
the solution of Eq. (16), and the capacity of each line,
we explore the robustness of the network with respect
to line failures. We rst consider the ideal scenario in
which all elements of the grid are working properly, i.e.,
all generators are running as scheduled and all lines are
operational. We say that the grid is N − 0 stable [52]
if the network has a stable xed point and the ows on
all lines are within the bounds of the security limits, i.e.
do not violate the overload condition Eq. (2), where the
ows are calculated by inserting the xed point solution
into Eq. (1).
Next, we assume the initial failure of a single trans-
mission line. We call the new network in which the cor-
responding line has been removed the N − 1 grid. Since
the aected transmission line can be any of the |E| lines
of the network, we have |E| dierent N − 1 grids. If
the N − 1 grid still has a xed point for all possible |E|
dierent initial failures, and all of these xed points re-
sult in ows within the capacity limits, the grid is said
to be N − 1 stable [36, 49, 50]. While traditional cas-
cade approaches usually test N − 0 or N − 1 stability
using mainly static ows, our proposal is to investigate
cascades by means of dynamically updated ows accord-
ing to the power grid dynamics of Eq. (1). This allows
for a more realistic modeling of real-time overloads and
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line failures. In practice, this means to solve the swing
equation dynamically, update ows and compare to the
capacity rule Eq. (2), removing lines whenever they ex-
ceed their capacity. Thereby, our N−1 stability criterion
demands not only the stable states to stay within the ca-
pacity limits but also includes the transient ows on all
lines. See Supplementary Note 1 for details on our pro-
cedure, and Supplementary Note 6 for an investigation
of the case of lines tripping after a nite overload time.
In order to illustrate how our dynamical model for cas-
cading failures works in practice, we rst consider the
case of the network with N = 5 nodes and |E| = 7
lines shown in Fig. 1. We assume that the network
has two generators, the two nodes reported as green
squares, characterized by a positive power P+ = 1.5/s2,
and three consumers, reported as red circles, with power
P− = −1/s2. For simplicity we have adopted here a
modied per unit system obtained by replacing real
machine parameters with dimensionless multiples with
respect to reference values. For instance, here a per
unit mechanical power Pper unit = 1/s
2 corresponds to
the real value Preal = 100MW [36, 50]. Moreover, we as-
sume homogeneous line parameters throughout the grid,
namely, we x the coupling for each couple of nodes i
and j as Kij = Kaij , with K = 1.63/s
2. In order to
prepare the system in its stable state, we solve Eq. (16)
and calculate the corresponding ows at equilibrium. We
then x a threshold value of α = 0.6. With such a value
of the threshold, none of the ows is in the overload con-
dition of Eq. (2), and the grid is N − 0 stable. Next,
we perturb the stable steady state of the grid with an
initial exogenous perturbation. Namely, we assume that
line (2, 4) fails at time t = 1, due to an external distur-
bance. By using again the static approach of Eq. (16) to
calculate the new steady state of the system, it is found
that all ows have changed but they still are all below
the limit of 0.6, as shown in Fig. 1(c). Hence, with re-
spect to a static analysis, the grid is N − 1-stable to
the failure of line (2, 4). Despite this, the capacity crite-
rion in Eq. (2) can be violated transiently, and secondary
outages emerge dynamically. As Fig. 1(d) shows, this is
indeed what happens in the example considered. Approx-
imately one second after the initial failure, the line (4, 5)
is overloaded, which causes a secondary failure, leading
to additional overloads on other lines and their failure in
a cascading process that eventually leads to the discon-
nection of the entire grid. The whole dynamics of the
cascade of failures induced by the initial removal of line
(2, 4) is reported in Fig. 1(d). A dynamical update of
the cascading algorithm is also shown in Supplementary
Movie 1.
Dynamical cascades are not limited to small networks
as the one considered in this example, but also appear
in large networks. In order to show this, we have im-
plemented our model for cascading failures on a network
based on the real structure of the Spanish high voltage
transmission grid. The network is reported in Fig. 2 and
has NSpanish = 98 nodes and |E|Spanish = 175 edges.
We remark that, while we have complete knowledge of
the network topology, due to only partial information
available on line parameters and power distribution, we
have to estimate those missing parameters. Therefore,
we have investigated several dierent power distributions
and coupling scenarios in our simulations, including ho-
mogeneous versus heterogeneous coupling, as well as con-
sidering cases with many small power plants, compared
to cases of fewer but larger plants. All parameter choices
we have adopted are further specied in Supplementary
Note 1 and the Data Availability Statement. We start by
selecting a set of distributed generators (green squares),
each with a positive power P+ = 1/s2, and consumers
(red circles), with negative power P− = −1/s2. As in the
case of the previous example, we adopt a homogeneous
coupling, namely we x Kij = Kaij with K = 5/s
2 for
each couple of nodes i and j. We also x a tolerance
value α = 0.52, such that none of the ows is in the over-
load condition of Eq. (2), and the grid is initially N − 0
stable. We notice from the eects of cascading failures
shown in Fig. 2 that the choice of the trigger line sig-
nicantly inuences the total number of lines damaged
during a cascade. For instance, the initial damage of line
1 (dashed red line) causes a large cascade of failures with
14 lines damaged in the rst seven seconds, while the ini-
tial damage of line 2 (dashed blue line) does not cause
any further line failure, as the initial shock is in this case
perfectly absorbed by the network. Figure 2 also dis-
plays the average number of failing lines as a function
of time. Here, we average over all lines of the network
considered as initially damaged lines. We notice that the
cascading process is relatively fast, with all failures tak-
ing place within the rst TCascade = 20 s. This further
supports the adoption of the swing equation, which is
indeed mainly used to describe short time scales, while
more complex and less tractable models are required to
model longer times [50].
Statistics of Dynamical Cascades
To better characterize the potential eects of cascad-
ing failures in electric power grids, we have studied the
statistical properties of cascades on the topology of real-
world power transmission grids, such as those of Spain
and France [53]. In particular, we have considered the
two systems under dierent values of the tolerance pa-
rameter α [27], and for various distributions of genera-
tors and consumers on the network. As in the examples
of the previous section, we have also analyzed all possi-
ble initial damages triggering the cascade. To assess the
consequences of a cascade, we have focused on the follow-
ing two quantities. First, we analyze the number of lines
that suered an overload, and are thus shut down during
the cascading failure process. This number is a measure
of the total damage suered by the system in terms of
loss of its connectivity. Second, we record the fraction

























Figure 2. The eect of a cascade of failures strongly depends on the choice of the initially damaged line. (a) The network of
the Spanish power grid with distributed generators with P+ = 1/s2 (green squares) and consumers with P− = −1/s2 (red
circles), homogeneous coupling K = 5/s2, and tolerance α = 0.52 is analyzed. Two dierent trigger lines are selected. (b)
The number of line failures as a function of time for the two dierent trigger lines highlighted in panel (a) and for an average
over all possible initial damages. Some lines do only cause a single line failure, while others aect a substantial amount of the
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Figure 3. Eects of cascading failures in the Spanish power grid under dierent levels of tolerance. (a) The percentage of line
failures in our model of cascading failures (circles), under dierent values of tolerance α is compared to the results of a static
xed point ow analysis (squares). The static analysis largely underestimates the actual number of line failures in a dynamical
approach. The dierence between static and dynamical analysis is especially clear in the inset where we focus on the lowest
values of α at which the network is N − 0 stable. The gray area is N − 0 unstable, i.e., the network without any external
damage already has overloaded lines. (b) Percentage of unsynchronized (damaged) nodes after the cascade as a function of
the tolerance α. All analysis has been performed under the same distribution of generators and consumers as in Fig. 2, with
homogeneous coupling of K = 5s−2.
ing the cascade, which represents a proxy for the number
of consumers aected by a blackout, see Supplementary
Note 1 for details on the implementation. In both the
cases of aected lines and aected nodes, the numbers
we look at are those obtained at the end of the cascading
failure process.
Fig. 3 shows the results obtained for the case of the net-
work of the Spanish power transmission grid. The same
homogeneous coupling and distribution of generators and
consumers is adopted as in Fig. 2. We have considered
each of the lines as a possible initial trigger of the cas-
cade, and averaged the nal number of line failures and
unsynchronized nodes over all realizations of the dynam-
ical process. We have repeated this for multiple values
of the tolerance coecient α. As expected, a larger tol-
erance results in fewer line failures and fewer unsynchro-
nized nodes, because it makes the overload condition of
Eq. (2) more dicult to be satised. As we decrease the
network tolerance α, the total number of aected lines
and unsynchronized nodes after the cascade suddenly in-
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creases at a value α ≈ 0.5, where we start to observe a
propagation of the cascade induced by the initial exter-
nal damage. Crucially, a dynamical approach, as the one
considered in our model, identies a signicantly larger
number of line failures (circles) compared to a static ap-
proach (squares). This is clearly visible in the inset of
the left hand side of Fig. 3, where we zoom to the lowest
values of α at which the network is N − 0 stable. For
instance, at α = 0.52 our model predicts that an average
of six lines of the Spanish power grid are aected by the
initial damage of a line of the network through a prop-
agation of failures. Such a vulnerability of the network
is completely unnoticeable by a static approach to cas-
cading failures based on the analysis of xed points. The
static approach reveals in fact that on average only an-
other line of the network will be aected. We also note
that the increase in the number of unsynchronized nodes
for decreasing values of α is much sharper than that for
overloaded lines. Below a value of α ≈ 0.5 the number
of unsynchronized nodes jumps to 100%. This transi-
tion indicates a loss of the N − 0 stability of the system,
meaning that, already in the unperturbed state several
lines are overloaded according to the capacity criterion
in Eq. (2) and thus fail. To study only genuine eects
of cascades, in the following we restrict ourselves to the
case α > 0.5, where the grid is N − 0 stable, but not
necessarily N − 1 stable. Furthermore, to assess the -
nal impact of a cascade on a network, we mainly focus
on total number of aected lines [4, 5]. As discussed in
the last section, damages to lines are indeed the most
elementary type of network damages.
Furthermore, we have explored the role of centralized
versus distributed power generation, and that of hetero-
geneous couplings Kij , and also extended our analysis
to other network topologies of European national power
grids, namely those of France and of Great Britain, see
Supplementary Note 2. In Fig. 4 we compare the re-
sults obtained for the Spanish network topology (three
top panels) to those obtained for the French network
(three bottom panels). With NFrench = 146 nodes and
|E|French = 223 edges the French power grid is larger
in size than the Spanish one considered in the previous
gures (NSpanish = 98 and |E|Spanish = 175) and has a
smaller clustering coecient. In each case, we have cal-
culated the total number of line failures at the end of the
cascading failure when any possible line of the network
is used as the initial trigger of the cascade. We then
plot the probability of having a certain number of line
failures in the process, so that the histogram reported
indicates the size of the largest cascades and how often
they occur. Notice that the probability axis uses a log-
scale. For each network we have considered both dis-
tributed and centralized locations of power generators,
and both homogeneous and heterogeneous network cou-
plings. The centralized generation is thereby a good ap-
proximation to the classical power grid design with few
large fossil and nuclear power plants powering the whole
grid. In contrast, the distributed generation scheme de-
scribes well the case in which many small (wind, solar,
biofuel, etc.) generators are distributed across the grid
[31]. Finally, the choice of heterogeneous coupling is mo-
tivated by economic considerations, since maintaining a
transmission network costs money and only those lines
that actually carry ow are used in practice. In partic-
ular, we have worked under the following three dierent
types of settings:
First, we consider distributed power and homogeneous
coupling with an equal number of generators and con-
sumers in the network, each of them having respectively
P+ = 1/s2 and P− = −1/s2. The network uses ho-
mogeneous coupling with Kij = Kaij and K = 5/s
2
for the Spanish (as in case of the previous gures) and
K = 8/s2 for the French grid. Results for this case are
shown in Fig. 4 (a) and (d). Next, we investigate central-
ized power and homogeneous couplings with consumers
with P− = −1/s2 and fewer but larger generators with
P+ ≈ 6/s2. The network uses homogeneous coupling
with K = 10/s2 for the Spanish and K = 9/s2 for the
French grid. Results for this case are shown in Fig. 4 (b)
and (e). Finally, we apply distributed power and hetero-
geneous coupling with homogeneous distribution of gen-
erators and consumers as in case 1. The network uses a
heterogeneous distribution of the Kij , so that the xed
point ows on the lines are approximately F ≈ 0.5K both
for the Spanish and the French grid, see Supplementary
Note 1 for details. Results for this case are shown in
Fig. 4 (c) and (f).
In each of the above cases, we work in conditions such
that no line is overloaded before the initial exogenous
damage. We have performed simulations for two val-
ues of the tolerance parameter α. For each of the two
grids and of the three conditions above, the lowest value
α = α1 has been selected to be equal to the minimal tol-
erance such that each the network is N−0 stable (yellow
histograms). In addition, we have considered a second,
larger value of the tolerance, α2, showing qualitatively
dierent behaviors (blue histograms). As found in other
studies [3133, 35], the (homogeneous) coupling K has
to be larger for centralized generation compared to dis-
tributed small generators to achieve comparable stability.
Initial line failures mostly do not cause any cascade and
if they do, cascades typically aect only a small number
of lines, see Fig. 4(a). This means that the Spanish grid
is in most of the cases N−1 stable even in our dynamical
model of cascades. Nevertheless, for α1, there exist a few
lines that, when damaged, trigger a substantial part of
the network to be disconnected. This leads to the ques-
tion whether and how the distribution of generators or
the topology of the network impact the size and frequency
of the cascade. When comparing distributed (many small
generators) in panel (a) to centralized power generation
(few large generators) in panel (b) we do not observe a
signicant dierence in the statistics of the cascades. The
same holds when comparing dierent network topologies,























































































Figure 4. Network damage distributions in the Spanish and French power grids considering dierent parameter settings. The
histograms shown have been obtained under three dierent settings. Panels (a) and (d) refer to the case of distributed power,
i.e., equal number of generators and consumers, each with P+ = 1/s2 and P− = −1/s2, and homogeneous coupling with
K = 5/s2 for the Spanish and K = 8/s2 for the French grid. Panels (b) and (e) refer to the case of centralized power, i.e.,
consumers with P− = −1/s2 and fewer but larger generators with P+ ≈ 6/s2, and homogeneous coupling with K = 10/s2 for
Spanish and K = 9/s2 for the French grid. Panels (c) and (f) refer to a case of distributed power as in panel (a) and (d), but
with heterogeneous coupling, so that the xed point ows on the lines are approximately F ≈ 0.5K both for the Spanish and
the French grid. For all plots we use two dierent tolerances α, where the lower one is the smallest simulated value of α so that
there are no initially overloaded lines (N − 0 stable).
Conversely, allowing heterogeneous couplings intro-
duces notable dierences to emerge in panels (c) and (f).
To obtain heterogeneous couplings, we have scaled Kij
at each line proportional to the ow at the stable oper-
ational state, see Supplementary Note 1. Thereby, we
try to emulate cost-ecient grid planning which only in-
cludes lines when they are used. However, our results
show that, under these conditions, the ow on a line with
large coupling cannot easily be re-routed in our hetero-
geneous network when it fails [35]. For certain initially
damaged lines, this leads to very large cascades in grids
with heterogeneous coupling Kij . For instance, both the
Spanish and the French power grid show a peak of proba-
bility corresponding to cascades of about 150 line failures
when α = α1. But also in the case of α2 = 0.8, which
corresponds to a N − 1 stable situation under the ho-
mogeneous coupling condition, the Spanish grid exhibits
cascades involving from 50 to 100 lines in 5% of the cases
under heterogeneous couplings, see panel (c). The nal
number of unsynchronized nodes after the cascade, used
as a measure of the network damage follows qualitatively
a similar statistics. Namely, distributed and centralized
power generation return similar statistical distributions
of damage, while under heterogeneous couplings the sys-
tem behaves dierently. Furthermore, for each network,
we have recorded the two extreme situations in which ei-
ther all nodes or the grid stay synchronized, or the whole
grid desynchronizes, see Supplementary Note 2.
What do the results obtained here imply about the ro-
bust operation of power grids? We have shown that a net-
work that is initially stable (N−0 stability), and remains
stable even to the initial damage of a line (N − 1 stabil-
ity) according to the standard static analysis of cascades,
can display large-scale dynamical cascades when prop-
erly modeled. Although these dynamical overload events
often have a very low probability, their occurrence can-
not be neglected since they may collapse the entire power
transmission network with catastrophic consequences. In
the examples studied, we have found that some critical
lines cause cascades resulting in a loss of up to 85% of
the edges (Fig. 4(c)). Hence, it is extremely important
to develop methods to identify such critical lines, which
is the subject of the next section.
Identifying critical lines
The statistical analysis presented in the previous sec-
tion revealed that the size of the cascades triggered by
dierent line failures is very heterogeneous. Most lines of
the networks investigated are not critical, i.e., they are
either N − 1 stable even in our dynamical model of cas-
cades, or cause only a very small number of secondary
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Figure 5. Introducing a ow-based estimator of the onset of
a cascade. When cutting an initial line, the ows on a typ-
ical edge (i, j) of the network increase from F old(red line)
to F new (orange line). Based on numerical observations, the
transient ow F (t) from the old to the new xed point are
well approximated as sinusoidal damped oscillation. Know-
ing the xed point ows, allows to compute the dierence
∆F = F new−F old and estimate the maximum transient ow
as Fmax ≈ F old + 2∆F . This estimation is typically slightly
larger than the real ow because the latter is damped.
in Fig. 4, some highly critical lines emerge. Thereby, the
initial failure of a single transmission line causes a global
cascade with the desynchronization of the majority of
nodes, leading to large blackouts. The key question here
is whether it is possible to devise a fast method to iden-
tify the critical lines of a network. This might prove to
be very useful when it comes to improving the robustness
of the network. In this section, we introduce a ow-based
indicator for the onset of a cascade and demonstrate the
eectiveness of its predictions by comparing them to re-
sults of the numerical simulation. In particular, we show
that our indicator is capable of identifying the critical
links of the network much better than other measures
purely based on the topology or steady state of the net-
work, such as the edge betweenness [11, 27, 28].
In order to dene a ow-based predictor for the onset of
a cascading failure, let us consider the typical time evolu-
tion of the ow along a line after the initial removal of the
rst damaged line (a, b). As illustrated in Fig. 5, we ob-
serve ow oscillations after the initial line failure, which
are well approximated by a damped sinusoidal function
of time. See also Supplementary Note 4 for the time
evolution of the ows for the case of the N = 5 node
graph introduced in Fig. 1. Now, the steady ows of the
network before and after the removal of the trigger line
are obtained by solving Eq. (16) for the xed point an-
gles {θ∗i }, which depend on the node powers {Pi} and
on the coupling matrix {Kij}. Thereby, we obtain a set
of nonlinear algebraic equations which have at least one
solution if the coupling K is larger than the critical cou-
pling [33]. For suciently large values of the coupling
K there can be multiple xed points [54]. In each case,
we determine a single xed point with small initial ows
by using Newton's method, see Supplementary Note 1
for details. From the values of the xed point angles
{θ∗} we calculate the equilibrium ow along each line,
for instance line (i, j), before and after the removal of
the trigger line, from the expression:





Let us indicate the initial ow along line (i, j) in the
intact network as F oldij , and the new ow after the re-
moval of the trigger line as F newij , assuming there still is
a xed point. Given enough time, the system settles in
the new xed point and the change of ow on the line is
∆Fij = F
new
ij − F oldij . Based on the oscillatory behavior
observed in cascading events, see Fig. 5 for an illustra-
tion, we approximate the time-dependent ow on the line
close to the new xed point as:
Fij (t) ≈ F newij −∆Fij cos (νijt) e−Dt, (4)
where νij is the oscillation frequency specic to the link
(i, j) and D is a damping factor. The maximum ow
Fmaxij on the line during the transient phase is then given
by:
Fmaxij ≈ F oldij + 2∆Fij . (5)
Hence, for the cascade predictor we propose to test
whether a line will be overloaded during the transient by
computing Fmaxij from the expression above and by check-
ing whether Fmaxij is larger than the available capacity Cij
of the link. This procedure provides a good approxima-
tion of the real ows. However, it requires xed point
calculations of the intact network and of the network af-
ter the initial trigger line is removed. Furthermore, it has
to be repeated for each possible initial trigger line, so that
a total of |E| + 1 xed points is being computed, with
|E| being the number of edges. A possible way to sim-
plify this procedure is to compute the xed point ows of
the intact grid F oldij only, approximating the xed point
ows after changes of the network topology by the Line
Outage Distribution Factor (LODF) [17, 18]. Details on
this method can be found in Supplementary Note 1.
After starting the cascade by removing line (a, b), we








based on the maximum transient














, then cutting line (a, b) as






of the network as that
value of α such that there is no secondary failure after




















where the maximum is taken with respect to all links






then, according to our prediction
method, we expect no additional line failures further to
the initial damaged line. Let us assume that the network
topology is given, for instance that of a real national
power grid, and that the tolerance level is preset due to






allows to engineer a resilient
grid by trying out dierent realizations of Kij . When
changes of Kij are small, the new xed point ows are
approximated by linear response of the old ows [17] giv-
ing us an easy way to design the power grid to fulll
safety requirements.
To measure the quality of our predictor for critical lines
and to compare it to alternative predictors, we quantify
its performance by evaluating how often it detects critical
lines as critical (true positives) compared to how often
it gives false alarms (false positives). In our model for
cascading failures, a potential trigger line is classied as
truly critical if its removal causes additional secondary
failures in the network according to the numerical simu-
lations of the dynamics [35]. The ow-based prediction






based on Eq. (7) and compar-
ing it with the xed tolerance α of a given simulation. If
the obtained minimal tolerance is larger than the value
of tolerance used in the numerical simulation, than the
line is classied as critical by our predictor and additional









< α+ σthr ⇒ not critical, (9)
with a variable threshold σthr ∈ [−1, 1], which allows to
tune the sensitiviy of the predictor.
Analogously, we dene a second predictor based on
the Line Outage Distribution Factor (LODF) [17, 18].
In this case, the expected minimal tolerance is obtained
by approximating the new ow by the LODF, instead of
computing them by solving for the new xed points, see
Supplementary Note 1.
We compare our predictors based on the ow dynamics
to the pure topological (or steady-state based) measures
that have been used in the classical analysis of cascades
on networks. The idea behind such measures is the fol-
lowing. First, we consider the initial load on all potential
trigger lines (a, b): L(a,b) = Fab(t = 0), i.e., the ow at
time t = 0 on the line, when the system is in its steady
state. Intuitively, highly loaded lines are expected to be
more critical than less loaded ones. Hence, comparing
each load L(a,b) to the maximum load on any line in the
grid Lmax := max(i,j) L











Lmax ⇒ not critical, (11)
where σthr ∈ [0, 1] is the prediction threshold.
Another quantity that is often used as a measure of the
importance of a network edge is the edge betweenness
[1, 2]. The betweenness b(a,b) of edge (a, b) is dened
as the normalized number of shortest paths passing by
the edge. A predictor based on the edge betweenness
b(a,b) is then obtained by replacing L(a,b) by b(a,b) in the
expressions above.
To evaluate the predictive power of the ow-based cas-
cade predictors and to compare them to the standard
topological predictors, we have computed the number of
lines that cause a cascade by simulation and compared
how often each predictor correctly predicted the cascade,
thereby deriving the rate of correct cascade predictions
(true positive rate) and rate of false alarms (false posi-
tive rate). These two quantities are displayed in a Re-
ceiver Operator Characteristics (ROC) curve, which re-
ports the true positive rate versus the false positive rate
when varying the threshold σthr. The ROC curve would
go up straight from point (0, 0) to point (0, 1) in the
ideal case in which the predictor is capable of detecting
all real cascade events, while never giving a false positive.
Conversely, random guessing corresponds to the bisector.
Finally, any realistic predictor starts at the point (0, 0),
i.e. never giving an alarm regardless of the setting, and
evolves to the point (1, 1), i.e. always giving an alarm.
The transition from (0, 0) to (1, 1) is tuned by decreasing
the threshold σthr determining when to give an alarm.
The ROC curves corresponding to the predictors in-
troduced above are shown in Fig. 6 (a). A prediction
based on the betweenness of the line is only as good as
a random guess. In contrast, using the LODF and the
initial load provide much better predictions. Finally, the
analytical prediction outperforms any other method, well
approximating an ideal predictor.
An alternative way to quantify the quality of a pre-
dictor is by evaluating the Area Under Curve (AUC),
that is the size of the area under the ROC curve. An
ideal predictor would correspond to the maximum pos-
sible value AUC= 1, while a random guess produces an
AUC of 0.5. So the closer the value of AUC for a given
predictor is to 1, the better are the obtained predictions.
AUC scores have been computed for dierent networks,
settings and parameters. The results for the dynamical
ow-based predictor, the predictor based on the LODF,
as well as the initial load and betweenness predictors, are
shown in Fig. 6 (b). The values of the AUC scores re-
ported correspond to the dierent settings described in
Fig. 4, allowing a more systematic comparison of predic-
tors than that provided by a single ROC curve. Also
from this gure it is clear that a prediction of the crit-
ical links based on their betweenness is on average only
slightly better than random guessing. Furthermore, this
result rises concerns on the indiscriminate use of the be-
tweenness as a measure of centrality in complex networks.
Especially when the dynamical processes of interest are
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Figure 6. Comparing the predictions of the ow-based indicator of critical lines to other standard measures. Four dierent
predictors are presented to determine whether a given line, if chosen as initially damaged, causes at least one additional line
failures. Our dynamical predictor (indicated as Transient) is based on the estimated maximum transient ow (5). The predictor
based on the Line Outage Distribution Factor (LODF) [17, 18] uses the same idea but computes the new xed ows based on
a linearization of the ow computation. Predictors based on betweenness and initial load classify a line as critical if it is within
the top σthr × 100% of the edges with highest betweenness/load with threshold σthr ∈ [0, 1]. Panel (a) shows the ROC curves
obtained for the Spanish grid with heterogeneous coupling and tolerance α = 0.7, while in panel (b) the AUC is displayed for
all network settings presented in Fig. 4. For each predictor all individual scores are displayed on the left and the mean with












Figure 7. Mapping the propagation of a cascade on the Spanish power grid. (a) The edges of the network are color-coded
based on the normalized arrival time of the cascade with respect to a specic initially damaged line, indicated as Trigger.,
and (b) based on their normalized distance with respect to the trigger using the eective distance measure in Eq. (12). In
both cases, darker colors indicate shorter distance/early arrival of the cascade. Normalization is carried out using the largest
distance/arrival time. Edges that are not plotted are not reached by the cascade at all. The analysis has been performed
using the Spanish grid with distributed generators with P+ = 1 (green squares), consumers with P− = −1/s2 (red circles),
heterogeneous coupling and tolerance α = 0.55.
well known, this must be taken into account in the de-
nition of dynamical centrality measures for complex net-
works [11, 55, 56]. The LODF and initial load predictors
perform relatively better on average, although they still
display large standard deviations. This means that, for
certain networks and settings they reach an AUC score
close to the perfect value of 1, while in some other cases
they only reach values of AUC equal to 0.8. Of these
two indicators, the initial load predictor results are more
reliable. Finally, our dynamical predictor, indicated in
gure as Transient outperforms all alternative ones, in
every single parameter and network realization. The g-
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ure indicates that the corresponding AUC scores reach
values very close to 1. Moreover, this indicator displays
the smallest standard deviation when dierent networks
and parameter settings are considered. In conclusion,
this seems to be the best indicator for the criticality of a
link. However, the results show that, although the initial
load predictor performs worse than our dynamical one,
it might still be used when computational resources are
scarce as it provides the second best predictions among
those considered.
Cascade propagation
So far, we have shown that network cascades, i.e., sec-
ondary failures following an initial trigger, can well be
caused by transient dynamical eects. We have pro-
posed a model for power grids that takes this into ac-
count, and we have also developed a reliable method to
predict whether additional lines can be aected by an ini-
tial damage, potentially triggering a cascade of failures.
However, knowing whether a cascade develops or not does
not answer another important question that is to under-
stand how the cascade evolves throughout the network,
and which nodes and links are aected and when. Intu-
itively, we expect that network components farther away
from the initial failure should be aected later by the
cascade. We have indeed observed that the time a line
fails and its distance from the initial triggering link are
correlated. Instead of merely using the graph topology to
measure distances, we use a more sophisticated distance
measure, the eective distance, based on the character-
istic ow from one node to its neighbors. This idea has
been rst introduced in Ref. [40] in the context of disease
spreading, where the eective distance has been shown
to be capable of capturing spreading phenomena better
than the standard graph distance. The eective distance
between two vertices i and j can be dened in our case
as:






Here, we used the coupling matrix Kij as a measure of
the ows between nodes [40]. All pairs of nodes not shar-
ing an edge, i.e. such that Kij = 0, have innite eective
distance dij =∞. At each node the cascade spreads to all
neighbors but those that are coupled tightly, get aected
the most and hence get assigned the smallest distance
dij . Furthermore, the eective distance is an asymmet-
ric measure, since dij 6= dji in general. The quantity dij
is a property of two nodes, while the most elementary
damage in our cascade model aects edges. Hence, the
concept of distance has to be extended from couples of
nodes to couples of links. For instance, in the case of an
unweighted network it is possible to dene the (standard)
distance between two edges as the number of hops along
a shortest path connecting the two edges. In the case of















Figure 8. Eective distances between the initial trigger and
secondary line outages are plotted as a function of time. Each
point in the plot represents one edge, while the straight line
is the result of a linear t. The reported t indicates that the
two quantities are related by an approximate linear relation-
ship with regression coecient R2 ≈ 0.94. Results refer to
the Spanish power grid with the same parameters and trigger
as used in Fig. 7.
a weighted graph we make use of the measure of eec-
tive distance in Eq. (12) to dene a distance between two
edges as the minimal path length of all weighted short-
est paths between two edges. The distance between two
edges can then be obtained based on the denition of
distances between nodes {dij}. Given the trigger edge
(a, b), the distance from edge (a, b) to edge (i, j) is given
by:
d(a,b)→(i,j) = dab + min
v1∈{a,b},v2∈{i,j}
dv1v2 (13)
i.e., it is the minimum of the shortest path lengths of the
paths a → i, a → j, b → i and b → j, plus the eective
distance between the two vertices a and b.
Fig. 7 shows that the eective distance is capable of
capturing well the properties of the spatial propagation
of the cascade over the network from the location of the
initial shock. The gure refers to the case of the Spanish
grid topology with heterogeneous coupling (see Figs. 2
and 4). The temporal evolution of one particular cascade
event, which is started by an initial exogenous damage
of the edge marked as Trigger, is reported. Network
edges are color-coded based on the actual arrival time of
the cascade in panel (a), and compared to a color code
based instead on their eective distance from the trig-
ger line in panel (b). Edges far away from the trigger
line, in terms of eective distance, have brighter colors
than edges close to the trigger. Similarly, lines at which
the cascade arrives later are brighter than lines aected
immediately. The gure clearly indicates that eective
distance and arrival time are highly correlated, i.e., the
cascade propagates throughout the network reaching ear-
lier those edges that are closer according to the denition
of eective distance. The relation between the eective
distance of a line from the initial trigger and the time it
takes for this line to be aected by the cascade is further
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investigated in the scatter plot of Fig. 8. We observe a
substantial correlation between arrival time and shortest
distance, indicating the possibility of an eective speed of
cascading failures across the network. The mean correla-
tion between cascade arrival time and eective distance,〈
R2e.
〉
≈ 0.91, is larger than between the arrival time





See Supplementary Note 5 for details and [57] for further
discussion on propagation of cascades.
DISCUSSION
In this work, we have proposed and studied a model
of electrical transmission networks highlighting the im-
portance of transient dynamical behavior in the emer-
gence and evolution of cascades of failures. The model
takes into account the intrinsic dynamical nature of the
system, in contrast to most other studies on supply net-
works, which are instead based on a static ow analysis.
Dierently from the existing works on cascading failures
in power grids [10, 1316, 2730], we have exploited the
dynamic nature of the swing equation to describe the
temporal behavior of the system, and we have adopted
an absolute ow threshold to model the propagation of
a cascade and to identify the critical lines of a network.
The dierences with respects to the results of a static ow
analysis are striking, as N − 1 secure power grids, i.e.,
grids for which the static analysis does not predict any
additional failures, can display large dynamical cascades.
This result emphasizes the importance of taking dynam-
ical transients of the order of seconds into account when
analyzing cascades, and should be considered by grid op-
erators when performing a power dispatch, or during grid
extensions. Notably, our dynamical model for cascades
not only reveals additional failures, but also allows to
study the details of the spreading of the cascade over the
network. We have investigated such a propagation by us-
ing an eective distance measure quantifying the distance
of a line (link of the network) from the original failure,
which strongly correlates with the time it takes for the
cascade to reach this line. The observed correlation be-
tween propagation time and eective distance of a failure,
points to the possibility of extracting an eective speed of
the cascade propagation. This result may thus stimulate
further research understanding propagation patterns on
networks. Being able to measure the speed of a cascade
would further contribute to the design of measures to
stop or contain cascades in real time because such prop-
agation speed determines how fast actions have to be
taken. We remark that an approximately constant speed
in terms of e.g. the eective distance measure, may repre-
sent a highly non-local spreading in terms of geographical
distances, also observed in [41, 57]. Moreover, propaga-
tion patterns of line failures caused by current overloads,
as investigated here, may be qualitatively dierent from
those caused by voltage eects [4, 58]. On longer time
scales the operation of control systems and emergency
measures such as load shedding must be taken into ac-
count to assess the impact of a cascade of failures. These
features are typically studied in quasi-static models such
that the short time scale considered in this paper oers
a complementary view to the spreading of cascading fail-
ures.
While the swing equation is capable of capturing in-
teresting dynamical eects previously unnoticed, it still
constitutes a comparably simple model to describe power
grids [50]. Alternative, more elaborated models would in-
volve more variables, e.g., voltages at each node of the
network to allow a description of longer time scales [59
62]. In addition, we only focused on the removal of in-
dividual lines in our framework, instead of including the
shutdown of power plants, i.e., the removal of network
nodes. These simplications are mainly justied by the
very same time scale of the dynamical phenomena. Most
cascades observed in the simulation are very fast, termi-
nating on a time scale of less than 10 seconds, which sup-
ports the choice of the swing equation [36, 50]. Further-
more, such short time scales are consistent with empirical
observations of real cascades in power grids, which were
caused in a very short time by overloaded lines. Con-
versely, power plants (nodes of the network) were usu-
ally shut down after the failure of a large fraction of the
transmission grid. The same holds for load shedding, i.e.,
disconnecting consumers. Summing up, while the over-
all blackout takes place over minutes, critical damage is
done within seconds due to line failures [4, 5, 7]. Hence,
this article models the short time scale of line failures
only.
In order to further support our conclusions, we have
considered additional models and discussed the validity
of the swing equation in Supplementary Note 3. In par-
ticular, we have also simulated a third order model that
includes voltage dynamics, nding qualitatively similar
results to those obtained with the swing equation. Fur-
thermore, a recent study [63] also highlights that a DC
approach misses important events, and an AC model is
necessary to capture all aspects of cascades. While the
authors in [63] use realistic (IEEE) grids and more de-
tailed simulation models, we complement this numerical
approach by providing semi-analytical insight into cas-
cades. Specically, we provide simple predictors of criti-
cal lines and observe a propagating cascade. Overall, our
work indicates that a dynamical second order model, as
the one adopted in our framework, is capable of captur-
ing additional features compared to static ow analyses,
while still making analytical approaches possible. This
allows to go beyond the methods commonly adopted in
the engineering literature, which are often solely based
on heavy computer simulations of specic scenarios, e.g.
[64].
Furthermore, concerning the delicate issue of protect-
ing the grid against random failures or targeted attacks,
it is crucial to be able to identify critical lines whose re-
moval might be causing large-scale outages. As we have
seen, most of the lines of the networks studied in this ar-
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ticle cause very small cascades when initially damaged.
However, our results have also unveiled the existence in
each of these networks of a few critical lines producing
large outages, which in certain cases can even aect the
entire grid. Within our modeling framework, we have
been able to develop an analytical ow predictor that
reliably identies critical lines and outperforms existing
topological measures in terms of prediction power. As an
alternative to the analytical ow predictor, when a faster
assessment of criticality is required, the stable state ows
of the intact grid can be used, although they are less reli-
able. We hope these two indicators can become a useful
tool for grid operators to test their current power dis-
patch strategies against cascading threads.
In a time when our lives depend more than ever on
the proper functioning of supply networks, we believe it
is crucial to understand their vulnerabilities and design
them to be as robust as possible. The results presented in
this article represent only a rst step in this direction and
many interesting questions remain to be investigated and
answered within our framework or similar approaches.
If cascades often propagate non-locally, can a quantity
like a propagation speed be dened or is it otherwise
possible to predict cascade arrival times in a unied way?
Which lines are aected by a large cascade, and which
parts of the network are capable of returning to a stable
state? What are the best mitigation strategies to contain
a cascade or to stop its propagation? All these questions
go beyond the scope of this article, whose aim was mainly
to provide a rst broad analysis of the importance of
transients in the emergence and evolution of cascades,
but we hope our results will trigger the interest of the




When it comes to model the dynamics of a power
transmission network, the swing equation is a simple
way to deal with the key features of the system as a
whole, namely its dynamical synchronization properties.
Thereby, we avoid dealing directly with a complete dy-
namical description in terms of complicated power grid
simulation software or static power-ow models which
are routinely used to simulate specic scenarios on large-
scale power grids by power engineers. The swing equation
retains the dynamical features of AC power grids, by de-
scribing each of the elements of an electric power network
as a rotating machine characterized by its angle and its
angular velocity at a given time. In practice, a rotating
machine either represents a large synchronous generator
in a conventional power plant or a coherent subgroup,
i.e., a group of strongly coupled small machines and loads
which are tightly phase-locked in all cases. Note that this
is a coarse-grained model where every node is modeled
as a rotating machine with eective inertia. A node with
higher demand than supply will then act as an eective
consumer, i.e., a synchronous motor. The angle of each
machine is assumed to be identical to the angle of the
complex voltage vector, so that the angle dierence of
two machines determines the power ow between them
to transport, for example, energy from a generator to a
consumer.
More formally, let us suppose to have N rotatory
machines, each corresponding to a node of a network.
Each machine i, with i = 1, 2, . . . , N is characterized
by its mechanical rotor angle θi(t) and by its angular
velocity ωi := dθi/dt relative to the reference frame of
Ω = 2π (50 or 60) Hz. Furthermore, machine i either
feeds power into the network, acting as an eective gen-
erator with power Pi > 0, or absorbs power, acting as an
eective consumer (corresponding to the aggregate con-
sumers of an urban areas) with power Pi < 0. The swing
equation reads [34, 50, 65]:
d
dt




ωi = Pi − γiωi +
N∑
j=1
Kij sin (θj − θi) , (15)
where γi is the homogeneous damping of an oscillator,
Ii is the inertia constant and Kij is a coupling matrix
governing the topology of the power grid network, and
the strength of the interactions. In the following, we
will both consider heterogeneous coupling Kij or we will
assume homogeneous coupling Kij = Kaij , where aij
are the entries of the unweighted adjacency matrix that
describes the connectivity of the network. For simplic-
ity, we assume homogeneous damping γi = γ and inertia
Ii = 1 for all i ∈ 1, ..., N . To derive Eq. (14) one has
to assume that the voltage amplitude Vi at each nodes
is time-independent, that ohmic losses are negligible and
that the changes in the angular velocity are small com-
pared to the reference ωi  Ω, see e.g, [36, 65] for details.
All these assumptions are fullled as long as we model
short time scales on the high-voltage transmission grid
[50] which will be sucient for our study. The coupling
matrix Kij is an abbreviation for Kij = BijViVj where
Bij is the susceptance between two nodes [36]. The swing
equation is especially well suited to describe short time
scales, as they appear in typical large-scale power grid
cascades [4, 5, 7], however, we also discuss other models
returning qualitatively similar results in Supplementary
Note 3.
The desired stable state of operation of the power grid
network is characterized by all machines running in syn-
chrony at the reference angular velocity Ω, i.e., ωi = 0
∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, implying
∑
i Pi = 0. Thereby, we deter-
mine the xed point by solving for the angles θ∗i in:









The grid in its synchronous state is phase-locked, i.e.,
all angle dierences do not change in time. This is impor-
tant since the angle dierence determines the ow along
a line, and uctuating angle dierences would imply uc-
tuating conducted power which can in turn lead to the
shutdown of a plant [36, 50]. Furthermore, transmission
system operators demand the frequency to stay within
strict boundaries to ensure stability and constant phase
locking [66].
Phase-locking and other synchronization phenomena
arise in many dierent domains and applications, and
have attracted the interest of physicists across elds [67].
One of the simplest synchronization models is the Ku-
ramoto model which has been used, among other applica-
tions, to describe synchronization phenomena in reies,
chemical reactions and simple neuronal models [6870].
The swing equation shows similarities with the Kuromoto
model, including the sinusoidal form of the coupling func-
tion and the existence of a minimal coupling threshold to
achieve synchronization [33]. However, the swing equa-
tion includes a second derivative due to the inertial forces
in the grid. Both equations share the same xed points
but the swing equations display dissipative forces and
limit cycles that are not present in the Kuramoto model.
Data availability
The networks used in this study and examples of ele-
mentary cascades are provided at https://osf.io/jz4m6/.
All data that support the results presented in the gures
of this study are available from the authors upon request.
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